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********************
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

********************
STATEMENT OF THE KIND
OF CASE
Appellant appeals from the order of
the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge of
the District Court of Salt Lake County,
denying appellant's petition for writ of
habeas corpus.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
A petition seeking his release from
the Utah State Prison was· filed by appellant on the ground that at the time of
his arrest he was in an advanced state of
intoxication and

incapable of ."having

his mental

so as to render his

confession given to police officers without counsel illegal.
The said

was summarily de-.

nied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the
order denying appellant's petition for
writ of habeas corpus.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 8, 1968, appellant had
been drinking a great quantity of Tokay
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wine and at approximately ·s:OO p.m. a
stabbing occurred in his hotel room (R.5253 in Case No. 11733).

Present in the

room were appellant, appellant's drinking
companion, Quimbly Ferguson, who was also
highly intoxicated, and Tony Trujillo,
the victim of the stabbing (R.55 in 11733).
Shortly after 5:00 p.m., the police
arrived at the scene, arrested appellant
and took him to police headquarters where
at 5:50 p.m. appellant was interrogated
(R.107 in 11733).

A tape recording was

made of the interrogation of appellant
wherein he supposedly waived his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
the assistance of counsel (R.94 in 11733).
Said tape also included self-incriminating
statements and admissions.
The interrogation was concluded one
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hour and thirty minutes after appellant's
last drink and at that time appellant's
blood alcohol level was .260 (R.70-71 in
11733).
On March 25, 1969, a trial was held
before Judge Merrill C. Faux and appellant
pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder
in the second degree.

After hearing the

evidence as stipulated by the prosecution
and the defense, Judge Faux found appellant guilty of murder in the second degree.
Appellant was thereafter sentenced to the
Utah State Prison for the indeterminate
term as fixed by law f o:t; the crime of
second degree murder.
Appellant appealed his conviction to
the Supreme Court of Utah, which court
affirmed the conviction.

The case is

reported at 24 Utah 2d 202,468 P21 639
(1970).
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On November 2, 1970, petitioner filed
a petition seeking his release from the
Utah State Prison upon the ground that he
was being illegally and unlawfully restrained
and detained by respondent as warden of the
Utah State Prison (R.l).
Said petition was summarily denied on
November 4, 1970,

(R.9) and appellant filed

a notice of appeal on November 16, 1970,
(R.

11).
ARGUMENT
Point

I

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN
GRANTED BECAUSE HE WAS INCAPABLE
OF A "KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT"
WAIVER OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
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In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.

s.

436

(1966), the Supreme Court of the United
States laid down specific.rules regarding
the admissibility of statements obtained
from an individual who is subjected to
custodial police interrogation.

As a

constitutional prerequisite to the admissibility of such statements, the suspect
must be warned prior to questioning that
he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used against
him, and that he has a right to the immediate presence of counsel and if he cannot
afford the same, counsel will be provided
for him without expense.

If the defendant

chooses to make a statement without exercising his constitutional rights i t must
be shown that he made a clear intelligent
waiver of those guaranteed rights.
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A heavy burden rests upon the state
to show that a valid constitutional waiver
was made.
If the interrogation continues
without the presence of an attorney
and a statement is taken, a heavy
burden rests on the government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his
privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or
appointed counsel.
384 U.S. at
475 (Emphasis added.)
Appellant contends that his highly
intoxicated condition at the time of
questioning made it impossible for him
to make a "knowing and intelligent"
waiver of his constitutional rights.
In Legner v. State of North Carolina,
260 F. Supp. 970 (M.D. N.C. 1966), it was
established that when a defendant is intoxicated to a degree which impairs his judgment, an attempt to waive his constitutional
rights is ineffectual.

In Langner, the
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defendant had been drinkirig heavily and
had been taking amphetamines.

The police

noted that "he wasn't walking like a sober
man" but they did not believe that he was
drunk enough to be arrested for public
drunkeness.

Upon closer observation the

police discovered that the defendant was
"obviously drunk".

The alleged waiver of

his constitutional rights was embodied in
the remark "I can tell you anything I want
to.

You still have to prove it."

In the

ruling that there was no valid waiver, the
court said:
The accused may always waive
his rights but his waiver must be
made voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently.
260 F. Supp. at
977.
The issue before this court is whether
the appellant was in such a state of intoxication that his judgment was impaired.

If
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it can be shown that there was an appreciable impairment of appellant's mental
faculties at the time of the alleged
waiver of his constitutional rights this
court must hold that the confession was
inadmissible and reverse the lower court
order denying appellant's writ of habeas
corpus.

Carnley v. Cochran 369 U.S. 506

(1962); Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60 (1942).
The record shows that at 6:30 p.m.
on November 8, one hour and

min-

utes after appellant's last drink, a
blood alcohol test was administered and
appellant showed a level of .260 (R.6970 in 11733).

A conservative estimate

of the blood alcohol level at the time
of the arrest and interrogation was
placed at .282 (R.71 in 11733).
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At trial a motion to

appel-

lant's confession was made but denied by
Judge Faux.

Appellant submits that the

motion should have been granted in that
the state had the burden of showing that
the waiver was made "intelligently and
knowingly" and it failed to sustain that
burden.
In Miranda, the court was
in placing the burden of proof upon the
state:
..... a heavy burden rests on the
government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to
retained or appointed counsel. This
court has always set high standards
of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, and we reassert
these standards as applied to in
custody interrogation.
384 U.S. at
475.
Appellant considers it significant
that the Supreme Court, in defining the
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the quality of waiver necessary under
Miranda, cites and quotes from an earlier
case, Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506
(1962):
The record must show, or there
must be an allegation and evidence
which show, that an accused was
offered counsel but intelligently
and understandingly rejected the
offer. Anything less is not waiver.
369 U.S. at 516.
Point II
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN
GRANTED BECAUSE HIS STATE OF INTOXICATION RENDERED HIS CONFESSION
"INVOLUNTARY", BUT SAID CONFESSION
WAS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides that
no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against

12
himself".

This constitut1onal mandate has

been formulated into the rule that convictions following the admission into evidence
of confessions whi'ch are i'nvoluntary I i' • e

•

I

the product of coercion, either physical or
psychological, cannot stand.

If such a

confession which offends due process forms
any part of the basis for a criminal conviction, then the conviction cannot stand
"even though there is ample evidence aside
from the confession to support the conviction."
(1964).

Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368
The rule was applied to the states

in Malloy v. Hogan, 378

1 (1964)

I

where the court stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment secures
against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement
-- the right of a person to remain
silent unless he chooses to speak
in the unfettered exercise of his
own will ..... 378 U.S. at 8.
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A confession made by 6ne in the appellant's advanced state of intoxication
could not be the product of a rational
intellect and a free will.

It has been

shown that any person with a .260 blood
alcohol level should suffer an appreciable impairment of his mental faculties,
especially his judgment and reason.

A

person who had lost control of his mental
faculties is incapable of making an admissible confession.
In Legner v. State of North Carolina,
Ibid, the defendant was a chronic alcoholic
who had been drinking heavily and had been
taking amphetamines.

The court ruled that

his confession was involuntary because
his mental faculties were appreciably
impaired by his advanced state of intoxication and that any decision to incriminate
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made in the intoxicated state could not
be free and unconstrained.
reasoned that

The court

if the defendant was charged

with being under the influence, this would
be adequate evidence that his mental faculties were impaired; and impaired to an
extent which would render any confession
11

involuntary".

In holding the confession

"involuntary", the court stated:
Was this confession the product
of an essentially free and unconstrained choice of its maker? This
Court must answer in the negative ..•
The petitioner's will have been
overborne by the alcohol and drugs.
Whether he had a false sense of confidence ..... or an acute sense of
remorse, his capacity for selfdetermination was critically impaired,
rendering any confession gained objectionable.·
260 F. Supp. at 976.
There can be no doubt that appellant's
capacity for self-determination was critically impaired.

The court in the Legner
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case accepted a charge of .driving under
the influence as sufficient evidence of
a critical impairment.

It

is significant

that in Utah a blood alcohol level of .08
is considered presumptive evidence that
the person is under the influence -of intoxicating liquor.

Section 41-6-44, Utah

Code Annotated (1969 Supp.).

Appellant's

blood alcohol level of .26 was conclusive
evidence that he was under the influence
of intoxicating liquors, and thus incapable
of making an admissible confession.
CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that he did not
"knowingly and intelligently" waive his
constitutional rights to remain silent to
assistance of counsel during questioning
as defined in Miranda v. Arizona, Ibid,
because his advanced state of intoxication
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resulted in an impairment

his mental

faculties which rendered him incapable
of a valid waiver.

In addition, appellant

contends that any statements made by him
during the police intarrogation were inadmissible as evidence since his blood
alcohol content of .260 caused him to be
so intoxicated as to render his statements
involuntary; and because the involuntary
confession was admitted into evidence,
appellant's writ of habeas corpus should
have been granted.
Based upon the foregoing, appellant
respectfully submits that the denial of
his petition for writ of habeas corpus be
reversed.
submitted,
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